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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do some local governments perform better than others that are socioeconomically, culturally, 
and geographically close? This paper examines variation in local government performance across 
209 Catalan municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants. We test whether the municipality’s adminis-
trative structure affects local government performance. In particular, we explore the effects of re-
placing a traditional public administration structure (i.e., headed by bureaucrats) with a new public 
management model (i.e., headed by city managers) in two dimensions: first, transparency and ac-
countability; and, second, financial performance. Results indicate that, ceteris paribus, municipalities 
with a city manager are more transparent, responsive and open to citizens, but do not perform 
better in financial indicators. Financial performance seems to be more driven by political factors: 
Right-wing governments are associated with higher debt levels but a faster ability to reduce debt; 
and, conversely, coalition governments are less indebted than single-party governments but are 
slower in debt reduction.  
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Introduction  
Public managers are in the spotlight. On one hand, managerial reforms in local governments have, 
for over a century, been seen as a tool to foster good government and to fight corruption. That was 
what the “founding father” of US city managers, Richard S. Childs, had in mind when devising 
them: to bring local governments closer “to the private business corporation with its well-
demonstrated capacity for efficiency” (Frant 1993, 996). Early on, American scholars noted that 
city managers made municipal government more rational (Hays 1964), more moral (Stone, Price 
and Stone 1940), more efficient (Dye 1967), and more encompassing of the major social groups in 
the municipality (Stillman 1974). Consequently, versions of the city manager have been adopted in 
many Western local governments (Mouritzen and Svara 2002) as well as in Latin America (Longo 
and Ramiò 2008) as a tool for improving governance within the general framework of new public 
management (NPM).  
On the other hand, despite conventional wisdom on the advantages of city managers, the empirical 
evidence to support having one is lacking (Bae and Feiock 2013, 780). Research during the latest 
decades on US municipalities reports little support of city managers on government performance 
(Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Hayes and Chang 1990; Jung 2006; Carr and Karuppusamy 2010). The 
conclusion after decades of empirical research on the performance of city managers is that “we 
simply do not know what we know” (Carr 2015). One of the reasons is that there is a lack of stud-
ies that directly explore the effects of city managers on proxies for effectiveness, economy, and 
efficiency (Carr 2015).  
Outside the United States, there is a complete lack of systematic studies on the effects of city man-
agers. And, generally speaking, there is neither a consensus on the effects of NPM reforms (Pollit 
and Bouckaert 2011). On one hand, managerial reforms in general have been questioned for in-
creasing corruption opportunities in developing or transition countries (Schick 1998; Polidano 
1999; Manning 2001; Peters 2001; Elias Sarker 2006) or reopening the way to corruption in ad-
vanced democracies (Bergh et al. 2016). Consequently, some scholars argue for a “revival of We-
berianism” (Pierre and Rothstein 2011, 407), given that “corruption and its related problems are of 
course the anathema of Weberianism” (Pierre and Rothstein 2011, 408), in contrast to the manage-
rial values of NPM. On the other hand, the introduction of city managers has been argued to con-
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tribute to improved policy-making and implementation both in Western democracies (Mouritzen 
and Svara 2002) and Latin America (Longo and Ramiò 2008).  
This paper aims to bridge these gaps by, first, contributing to the general debate on the perfor-
mance effects of managerial reforms in general, and the introduction of city managers in particular, 
outside the US context. We will compare the performance of local governments in Spain’s Catalo-
nia region, where municipalities with a traditional public administration (TPA) structure headed by 
autonomous civil servants cohabit with municipalities with a NPM structure headed by city manag-
ers. And, second, we will directly examine the effects of city managers on specific indicators of 
transparency and accountability, and financial performance. 
Municipal governments in Catalonia thus represent a unique setting, and a least-likely case, to test 
the effects of managerial reforms. Catalonia has two distinctive forms of local administration within 
the strong mayoral form of government characteristic of Spanish municipalities (Mouritzen and 
Svara 2002). First, like the vast majority of Spanish municipalities, many Catalan municipalities have 
a TPA model, where the chief administrative officer (CAO) is a nationally recruited civil servant 
who exerts a legal check on the local government’s actions (Mouritzen and Svara 2002). The organ-
ization of Spanish local governments is, thus, similar to other Southern European countries, influ-
enced by French administrative law (Torres, Pina, and Martí 2010). Second, following the example 
of Barcelona during the Olympic Games (1992), many Catalan municipalities have adopted an 
NPM structure in which city managers are in charge of the local administration (Brugué and 
Gallego 2003; Longo 2003).  
Unlike American city managers under the council-manager form of government and unlike city 
managers in other Western countries—such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Nether-
lands, Ireland, the UK, or Belgium (Mouritzen and Svara 2002)—city managers in Catalonia cohab-
it with a strong mayor, who can hire and fire them at will. Consequently, Catalan municipalities 
represent a least-likely scenario: If we find effects of city managers on performance in a case where 
city managers lack the autonomy their counterparts in other Western countries enjoy, then we can 
be more confident in the effect city managers may have in other scenarios.  
Theoretically, the paper bases its hypotheses on the existing literature on the effects of a city man-
ager’s professionalism. Accounts from different countries and historical periods note that managers 
form an epistemic community. They tend to observe peer group review and their own standards of 
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expertise (Stillman 1977), adhering to codes of ethics, even when it is voluntary (Adrian and Press 
1977). This professionalism would encourage city managers to resist the pressures of both politi-
cians and administrators (Ramiò and Salvador 2012), such as short-sighted policies (Feiock, Jeong, 
and Kim 2003), and ensure a stronger commitment to efficiency and innovation (Schneider, Teske, 
and Mintrom 1995). Consequently, ceteris paribus, the presence of city managers should improve 
local government performance. 
Empirically, we test the effects of city managers using cross-section OLS analyses with different 
dependent variables capturing two aspects of local government performance. First, we explore the 
effects of city managers on different indicators of transparency and accountability: an index of the 
publicly disclosed information by the municipal government; a proxy for the extent that a local 
administration reacts to citizens’ requests (measured by the number of days to respond to infor-
mation requests); and an indicator for the direct participation of citizens in policy-making (i.e., the 
number of direct consultations opened by the local government for a given year).  
And, second, we analyze the effects of having a city manager on economic efficiency by exploring a 
series of financial performance indicators: the budget surplus/deficit, the level of municipal debt in 
a given year, the debt reduction/increase, the municipal net savings, the payment compliance, and 
the tax collection effectiveness (percent difference between the actual and projected tax income).  
In order to deal with potential problems of endogeneity and reverse causality, we follow a twofold 
strategy. First, we control for variables that the literature on the adoption and abandonment of city 
managers (Kessel 1962; Gordon 1968; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013) has 
noted as relevant factors, and for which we have data for Catalan municipalities, such as fiscal 
health of the local government, the ideology of the incumbent, and socio-economic contextual 
variables, GDP per capita, and usual proxies for social capital, such as the level of blood donations 
at the municipal level. Second, we instrument our independent variable (i.e., the existence of a city 
manager in the local administration) with a variable correlated with the adoption of city managers 
and not correlated with the dependent variables (on local government performance): the distance 
(in kilometers) from the town to Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia and Spain’s pioneering city in 
adopting a city manager in the years leading to the 1992 Olympic Games.  
Despite these efforts, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of reverse causality, and there 
could be unobserved factors affecting both the adoption of city managers and local government 
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performance. For instance, there could be some prevailing local “ethos” fostering or hindering 
both the adoption of city managers and good local governance in Catalan municipalities, like the 
one famously argued by Wilson and Banfield (1963, 1971) for the United States. Yet, along the lines 
of empirical studies for US municipalities spanning over 50 years, from Wolfinger and Field’s 
(1966) failure to find support for Wilson and Banfield’s thesis to the encompassing test of multiple 
contextual factors by Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013), this study does not find indications that there is 
a systematic difference in ethos across the surveyed municipalities. Similarly, the existing scholar-
ship on adoption in Catalan municipalities (Longo 2003; Brugué and Gallego 2003; Fernández 
2013; Drapalova 2016) does not highlight any particular ethos as driving the adoption of city man-
agers and, quite the opposite, it points out a variety of factors as leading to the establishment of city 
managers in some towns and not in others. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the hypotheses on why we should 
expect better performance indicators in local governments with city managers, in comparison to 
those with a TPA government structure. Subsequently, we discuss the case selection—a novel da-
taset on 209 Catalan municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants—and the methods employed (OLS 
regressions with an instrumental variable). The results section shows positive effects of city manag-
ers on the transparency and accountability dimension, but null effects on financial performance, 
after controlling for a series of socioeconomic and political factors.  
The presence of a manager in a local administration increases the transparency of municipal gov-
ernment by 2.5 points on the scale from 0 to 100, and, with each additional year of having a city 
manager in office the transparency increases by 0.47 points. Additionally, the presence of a city 
manager reduces the period to respond to information requests to municipal officials by 17 days. 
The presence of a city manager is also associated with a 0.49 unit increase in the number of citizens’ 
consultations, which taking into account that the average number of consultations is two (with a 
maximum of 8), this is a considerable effect. In sum, having a city manager seems to foster a more 
accountable and transparent local government.  
Intriguingly, the results do not show a clear positive effect of city managers on financial perfor-
mance. Having a city manager is not statistically correlated with the available measures of financial 
health explored—for example, the level of debt, the budget surplus/deficit, the debt reduc-
tion/increase (euros/capita), net savings (in %)—even controlling for the initial debt levels, in or-
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der to reduce the problems of reverse causality. If any, having a city manager has a negative, alt-
hough not significant, effect on municipal payment compliance, and a negative, and this time signif-
icant, effect on tax collection efficacy.  
Unlike what happens with transparency and accountability, political factors seem to matter more to 
financial performance. Specifically, we find that right-wing governments, on one hand, tend to have 
higher municipal debt levels; on the other, they are faster in reducing such debt levels. The effects 
of coalition governments—vis-à-vis majority or minority single-party governments—are almost 
opposite to the effects of right-wing governments. Coalition governments, on one hand, tend to be 
less indebted than single-party governments, and save more. On the other, they are less successful 
in reducing municipal debt.  
Theory 
There is an agreement in the literature that the presence of city managers alters the motivations and 
incentives of local executives (Terman and Feiock 2015). Their professionalism brings different 
values, orientations, and career interests to the local administrations (Feiock and Kim 2003). Yet 
there is less agreement on whether the particular effects of city managers, or the general effects of 
introducing the managerial logic in public administrations, are positive or negative for local gov-
ernment performance.  
Many scholars and policy-makers fear the appointment of managerial figures in the public realm 
aimed to “escape the iron cage of legalism” (Pierre and Rothstein 2011, 414). Consequently, we 
should re-think the replacement of career bureaucrats for private-sector-like managers. As Olsen 
eloquently states after noting the problems generated by many managerial reforms, “maybe it is 
time to rediscover bureaucracy” (2006, 1). A Weberian administration with civil service protections 
and lifelong careers may provide the motivation and capacity to improve government performance 
(Olsen 2006). Even if sometimes “Weberian bureaucracy is infuriating” (Knott and Miller 2006, 
239), civil servants routinely applying standard operating procedures stabilizes the rules of the game 
and gives predictability (Knott and Miller 2006). This is the argument behind the permanence of 
career civil servants as municipal CAOs in several countries belonging to the Napoleonic adminis-
trative tradition, such as France or Spain (Mouritzen and Svara 2002). These career bureaucrats 
acting as CAOs mostly undertake a legal check of what otherwise is a monopolistic control of poli-
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cy-making by elected officials. Using Pierre’s (2011) terminology, they emphasize more “law” than 
“management.”     
Consequently, it is argued that in practice, Weberian bureaucracies may introduce a long causal 
chain from politicians’ commands to actual compliance by street-level bureaucrats (Olsen 2006). 
The practical result can be a red-tape-ridden administration. And, as the successful introduction of 
NPM reforms in local governments such as those of Denmark and Sweden indicates, moving away 
from a rule-bound Weberian bureaucracy may lead to better performance (Pierre and Rothstein 
2011). NPM instruments, such as the introduction of city managers, would thus imply a shift from 
a focus on “law” to a focus on “management.” Managers enjoy a larger margin of maneuver than 
their Weberian counterparts (i.e., protected civil servants). Free from bureaucratic red tape, auton-
omous public managers, such as those in charge of cutting-edge Danish and Swedish day-care and 
preschool facilities, may use their flexibility to maximize the well-being of every child. In those 
cases, when managers do follow their professional managerial ethos, managerial reforms do seem to 
lead to a more effective and efficient provision of public services (Pierre and Rothstein 2011). 
As several scholars have underlined, it is not that city managers are less self-interested (Feiock and 
Kim 2003), but that they are responsive to their professional peers and their professional associa-
tions, such as the American International City/County Management Association (ICMA) (Adrian 
and Press 1977; Nalbandian 1989) or the Catalan Associació Catalana de Gestió Pública (Longo 2002). 
The result is a labor market of city managers (Ramiò and Salvador 2012) in which the employment 
opportunities of city managers increase if they are known to implement efficient and innovative 
management strategies (Feiock and Kim 2003). This contrasts with the low-powered incentives 
prevailing within a Weberian-like local administration where the CAO is a civil servant with a life-
long career whose mission is to check the legality of political officials’ initiatives, as it is customary 
in most Spanish municipalities (Mouritzen and Svara 2002).  
Following this reasoning, municipalities with city managers should present more equilibrated budg-
ets, more efficient services, but also more accountability, less abuse of power, and more transparen-
cy. In particular, we test two different hypotheses on the effects of city managers on municipal 
performance. The first is a hypothesis on transparency and accountability: Should we expect munic-
ipalities with city managers as CAOs to be more transparent and more responsive to citizens’ de-
mands than towns where the CAO is a civil servant? The second hypothesis regards financial per-
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formance: Should we expect municipalities with city managers as CAOs to have more sound fi-
nances than those with standard career bureaucrats as CAOs?  
Regarding transparency and accountability, most of the literature presumes city managers are less 
responsive to specific interests and more responsive to the whole community at large (Carr 2015). 
Managers will avoid actions that may damage their reputation of neutrality and impartiality, such as 
corruption and unethical behavior. It has long been argued that city managers tend to give high 
importance to peer group review (Stillman 1977) and that despite the affiliation to ICMA being 
voluntary, its code of ethics is widely respected by most city managers (Adrian and Press 1977), 
who are aware of the high reputation costs they would face by not adhering to them. Empirically, it 
has been found that city managers seem less eager to accommodate specific interests, such as, those 
of property owners (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez 2009), or those of wealthier citizens at the ex-
pense of the well-being of the whole community (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003). Similarly, industri-
al interest groups seem to exert more negative impacts on the adoption of sustainability policies in 
towns lacking a city manager (Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011). City managers help to adopt policies 
that are more comprehensive and accountable to the whole community (Svara, Watt, and Jang 
2013; Homsy and Warner 2015).  
Related to this, scholars have noted that city managers are more likely to encourage public partici-
pation and involve residents in policy-making beyond voting (Nalbandian et al. 2013; Carr 2015). 
Although city managers do not seem to exert a positive influence on voting turnout (Carr 2015) 
and on the perceptions of representational effectiveness (Ihrke 2002), they have been found to have 
a significant effect on other participation mechanisms. For instance, Nelson and Wood (2010) 
found that towns with a city manager made more extensive use of 16 participation strategies than 
cities without. And, generally speaking, city managers are more likely to adopt innovative practices, 
such as e-government and measures associated with reinventing government (Nelson and Svara 
2012).  
As a result of these insights from the existing literature, in our analysis we should thus expect city 
managers to adopt more measures of transparency and innovative practices in accountability and 
open government, such as a higher disclosure of information, a swift responsiveness to citizens’ 
queries, and a more extensive use of public participation mechanisms beyond voting.  
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Regarding the second hypothesis, according to a relatively large literature, one should expect better 
financial performance of towns with the city manager. To start with, city managers spend signifi-
cantly more of their time managing the municipal organization than CAOs who are not city manag-
ers (Newell and Ammons 1987; Carr 2015). Although some scholars have found that towns with 
city managers have higher spending than cities without them (Campbell and Turnbull 2003; Craw 
2008), the conventional view in the literature is that towns with city managers tend to spend less 
(Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Dye and Garcia 1978; Anderson 1979) and put more emphasis on the 
efficiency of government operations (Stein 1990; Zhang and Feiock 2010). Unlike elected officials, 
managers do not need to cultivate political support among voters (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001), 
they do “less political decision making” and “more professional management” (Carr 2015, 675), 
and they may prefer policies that reduce operational costs in the public sector, such as efficiency 
enhancements in climate change mitigation efforts (Bae and Feiock 2013). City managers are sup-
posed to be more responsive to the norms of professional management issued by the ICMA than 
to the short-sighted demands of municipal politics (Carr 2015).  
And although the evidence is weaker than the conventional view of the efficiency and efficacy of 
city managers (Carr 2015), cities with a city manager have higher perceptions of service quality (Ih-
rke 2002; Wood and Fan 2008) and higher levels of service (Folz and Abdelrazek 2009) than in 
cities without. They also seem to use more managerial techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis (Ha 
and Feiock 2012).  
This evidence for US municipalities seems to align with the anecdotal evidence on Catalan city 
managers. In Catalonia, it has been noted that despite their heterogeneous backgrounds, most man-
agers tend to have a business degree, they form an epistemic community of shared professional 
norms, and, by moving across administrations, they have created a Catalan labor market of public 
managers (Ramiò and Salvador 2012). Consequently, we should expect more concern with efficien-
cy and thus better financial performance in municipalities with a city manager than in municipalities 
lacking this figure.  
In sum, we aim to test the following two hypotheses on the effects of city managers on the perfor-
mance of local governments: 
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H1: Towns with a city manager as CAO will be more transparent (i.e., disclose more information) and accountable 
(i.e., respond quicker to citizens’ demands and involve residents in decision-making through consultations) than cities 
without a city manager. 
H2: Towns with a city manager as CAO will exhibit better financial performance (i.e., lower municipal debt, more 
savings, and higher tax collection effectiveness) than towns without a city manager.  
Case Selection, Data, and Methods 
The empirical test of these hypotheses relies on data from the Pi i Sunyer Foundation on administra-
tive structure and performance of Catalan municipalities.1 We complement the data with indicators 
of economic performance and public goods delivery from several governmental, regional, and pri-
vate organizations as well as from already published research. We limit our sample to all cities over 
5,000 inhabitants because under this threshold most of the socioeconomic indicators are not avail-
able. Also, small cities have low administrative professionalization and limited capacity to provide 
public services. Even limiting our sample, there is still a large variation in the main variables of 
theoretical interest. Moreover, the subnational focus enables us to control for a wide array of fac-
tors by the way of design, thereby improving the causal inference (Snyder 2001; Slater and Ziblatt 
2013).  
Estimation Techniques 
To test our hypotheses, the analysis proceeds in two stages. First, in order to test the effect of city 
managers’ presence on our dependent variables we employ a multivariate linear regression. We 
separately examine several models having the transparency, the number of citizens’ initiatives, and 
economic performance indicators as the dependent variables. After diagnostics, we excluded Barce-
lona and Vandellòs i l'Hospitalet de l'Infant as influential cases, one for being too large and the 
latter for being excessively rich.  
                                                     
1
 The survey data were compiled on the biannual basis from 2005 to 2014 in all provinces of Catalonia. The survey 
combined basic municipality information with data on its structure and functioning (at the political and management 
level), on its public services and the management formula used for its production, and on economic and budgetary 
information. The data are not based on opinion but on evidence.  
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Due to the cross-sectional format of our data, in the second stage we employ a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) instrumental analysis in order to limit the risk of endogeneity between our inde-
pendent and dependent variables. As it is possible that cities that perform better are more likely to 
adopt administrative reforms, such as having a city manager, than those that perform comparatively 
worse, we use the distance in kilometers from Barcelona as the instrument.2 Barcelona was the first 
town to adopt this administrative innovation. The distance is a good instrument because the prox-
imity to Barcelona could potentially influence the likelihood of having a city manager due to a dif-
fusion effect. The cities that are close could learn about administrative reforms more swiftly as their 
administrators and politicians interact more frequently. Moreover, there are no theoretical or empir-
ical reasons to think that the distance from Barcelona influences on its own the dependent variables 
of transparency explored here.  
Independent Variable 
The main independent variable is the presence of a city manager in the municipality. The city man-
ager (gerent in Catalan) was adopted during the 1990s in the city of Barcelona as a part of the long-
term process of administrative innovation and spread across other cities in Catalonia during early 
2000s. Previously, most of the city manager’s competencies were performed by the municipal secre-
tary general. According to the study by the research institute of local government Pí i Sunyer Foun-
dation, cities with dual government are on average larger. From the 29 municipalities with over 
40,000 inhabitants, 12 have a city manager (Magre Ferran 2006). That is, 37% of the population of 
Catalonia lives in cities with dual government (with mayor and city manager).  
In order to be considered a city manager, the local directive has to fulfill two conditions. First, he 
or she should occupy a position of hierarchical superiority over other civil servants who report to 
him or her. Second, he or she has direct control and supervision over municipal finances and budg-
et, general services, personnel hiring, and information systems (IT) (Recoder and Joly 2010). There 
can be some slight variations in terms of specific responsibilities, but, in all cases, the city manager’s 
main task is to introduce efficiency in the management of the local administration and to control 
policy implementation and evaluation.  
                                                     
2 We use Google Maps for the calculation of distances: http://www.distanciasentreciudades.com 
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For the purpose of this paper, we operationalize the city manager in two ways. First, the city man-
ager is operationalized as a dummy variable scoring one if the city has a city manager. The data are 
from the survey by Pí i Sunyer Foundation.3 From a total of 209 cities in the sample (see Table 1), 
54 cities replied affirmatively in 2014 (25.8% of the sample). We also checked the municipal statutes 
to control that in all these cities the city manager really exists. The second version of our independ-
ent variable is “years of city manager.” It is operationalized as number of years since the adoption 
of a city manager in a municipality. Given the first survey is from 2006 and the last is from 2014, 
the maximum value is 8 years. We expect that the positive effect of this figure will be larger in cities 
where the city manager was established for a longer period. 
TABLE 1, SUMMARY OF CITY MANAGERS BY CITY SIZE 
Manager Size of City Total 
Small 
5,000 to 10,000 
inhabitants 
Medium 
From 10,000 to 50,000 
inhabitants 
Large 
More than 50,000 
inhabitants 
No 72 73 9 154 
Yes 17 23 14 54 
Total 89 96 23 208 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
Dependent Variables 
We focus on two aspects of government performance: transparency and accountability, and finan-
cial performance or economic efficiency. Transparency is operationalized through three indicators. 
First, we employ a proxy for “top-down” transparency (i.e., the level of information on municipal 
activities disclosed by the local government). This index of publicly disclosed information by the 
municipal government ranges from 0 (least transparent) to 100 (most transparent). The 2015 data 
were provided by two institutions: a non-government organization, Fundació Pí i Sunyer 
(www.pisunyer.org), and the regional government, Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya (www.sindic.cat). 
Second, we also use an indicator of access to information or “bottom-up” transparency (i.e., up to 
which extent the local administration reacts to citizens’ requests as measured by the number of 
days to respond to a request for information). These data were provided by Villoria et al. (2016) 
and Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya (www.sindic.cat). The third indicator of transparency and account-
ability relates to direct participation by citizens. We, therefore, included a variable that measures the 
                                                     
3
 The exact wording of the question is, “Existeix la figura de gerent, coordinador general, direct?” (Does the figure of 
manager, general coordinator, and director exist in your municipality?). 
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citizens’ participation operationalized as a number of direct consultations in one year (2015), 
also from the Pí i Sunyer Foundation survey. 
The municipal economic efficiency is operationalized by several indicators. First, we have included 
the level of municipal debt in 2015 (calculated as a percent of the municipal income). Neverthe-
less, the total level of debt can be determined by many other political and economic factors as well 
as being a result of previous economic situations and investments. We have complemented this 
indicator with others that are more related to economic management of the municipality on which 
the city manager should have an impact. We included the budget surplus/deficit (euros/capita), 
debt reduction/increase (euros/capita), net savings (%), payment compliance (%), and tax collec-
tion effectiveness (percent difference between the actual and projected tax income). These indica-
tors are the most exhaustive available proxies for local economic efficiency. The data are provided 
for 2015 by the Ministry of Economy (www.minhap.es) and Sielocal (www.sielocal.org). 
Control Variables 
Although the argument developed here focuses on the effects of the city manager on local govern-
ment, other factors may affect performance. We, therefore, added numerous controls to the analy-
sis informed by the existing literature. We control for the municipal size measured as a number of 
inhabitants registered in the municipality. We use data from municipal registers, retrieved from 
(www.ine.es). We also control for the per capita GDP (in euros) to account for the municipal soci-
oeconomic development that might influence the capacity and efficiency of local administration. 
The data are provided by Mendez et al. (2015) for 2012 only. Previous economic performance can 
be an important determinant of future performance; therefore, we use public deficit per capita and 
municipal income (euro per capita) (www.minhap.es). As a measure of social capital, we use the 
blood-donor index calculated as the number of donations per thousand inhabitants. Data were 
provided by the Blood and Tissue Bank Catalonia (http://www.bancsang.net/en_index/). This 
indicator is an alternative to newspaper readership, which has already been used by other authors 
(Cartocci 2007). Other indicators of civicness, such as the number of associations that exist in a 
town, are not available at the local level.4 
                                                     
4 Also, voter turnout in referendums is a problematic indicator for the Spanish case. Spain has celebrated only four 
general referenda (in 1976, 1978, 1986, and 2005) since the transition to democracy. The data at the municipal level 
are available only for the last two. The 1986 referendum was held to vote on NATO membership; it was highly politi-
cized and followed the left-right cleavage. The last referendum took place in 2005 to accept the EU constitution.  
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In order to control for the education level of a population, we calculate the share of the population 
with completed tertiary education. The data are available for the Catalan statistical office 
(www.idescat.cat/) for 2011 only. We also include controls for the existence of a coalition govern-
ment. We use the question (Podria indicar el tipus de govern actual?) from the local government survey 
by Pí i Sunyer Foundation. We recoded the question as a dummy variable with 1 indicating coali-
tion government and 0 otherwise. The mayor’s party ideology could also play a role, especially in 
influencing the economic policies (Ansell and Gingrich 2003). This indicator is operationalized as a 
dummy variable capturing whether the municipality is run by a center-right coalition. Table 2 re-
ports the summary statistics. 
TABLE 2, SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Manager 208 .2596154 .4394813 0 1 
Manager years 208 2.120192 3.12694 0 8 
Blood-donor index 203 30.57498 18.47344 5.040202 122.6501 
Population 208 32503.25 116678.9 5062 1620943 
GDP (2012) 208 21935.45 8816.092 7154.86 95599.59 
Coalition gov. 208 .6057692 .4898638 0 1 
Tertiary education 
(%) 
208 16.95582 6.751395 5.52 46.32 
Local income (eu-
ro/capita) 
208 1170.576 451.386 0 3039.42 
Debt (2011) 208 2251.036 2309.851 33.1567 10378 
N. citizens’ initiatives 194 1.087629 1.643814 0 12 
Public goods invest-
ment (2014) 
206 208.097 90.8462 77.77 867.11 
Surplus/deficit 208 3868054 1.16e+07 -4130786 1.53e+08 
Level of debt (%) 208 49.94962 37.49837 0 211.68 
Debt increase 208 -2182871 1.01e+07 -1.35e+08 1.19e+07 
Debt per capita 208 558.3965 466.8759 0 2740.18 
Tax collection effica-
cy 
(%) 
208 83.11538 19.39445 0 96.56 
Payment compliance 208 86.2124 20.09227 0 99.21 
Net savings 208 10.25298 8.615795 -32.7 44.25 
Source:  Pi I Suyner; Spanish Ministry of Economy; SIELOCAL; Blood and Tissue Bank Cataluna; Idescat.es; Drapalova 
(2016) 
 
Analysis and Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show the magnitude and significance of the coefficients for the independent varia-
bles listed in the previous sections under a set of the above-specified controls. Each column reports 
coefficient estimates corresponding to the explanatory variables listed on the left, together with 
their robust standard errors and statistical significance. We anticipate that the city manager has a 
positive effect on both city transparency and economic performance. The results for transparency 
and accountability support the hypotheses. For instance, Models 1 and 1a show that the presence 
of a city manager (more years of a city manager) is positively and significantly associated with mu-
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nicipal transparency (H1). Holding all other variables constant, the presence of a city manager is 
expected to result in an average increase in 2.5 points in municipal transparency (on the scale from 
0 to 100) (coefficient significant at 0.1). With each additional year of a city manager in office, trans-
parency increases by 0.47 points (coefficient significant at 0.05). Therefore, city managers seem to 
be linked to more top-down information disclosure.  
TABLE 3, CITY MANAGER EFFECT ON MEASURES OF MUNICIPAL TRANSPARENCY AND AC-
COUNTABILITY. OLS RESULTS 
 
 Transparency Transparency Citizen request 
(days) 
Citizen participation 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 1a Model 2 Model 3 
     
manager_years  0.477**   
  (0.232)   
blood-donor_index -0.0205 -0.0173 0.0367 0.00195 
 (0.0340) (0.0336) (0.177) (0.00715) 
inhab 1.30e-07*** 1.31e-07*** -7.90e-08 1.30e-08* 
 (2.64e-08) (2.43e-08) (6.00e-08) (7.78e-09) 
lggnp -0.351 -0.235 -9.495 -0.258 
 (2.219) (2.182) (11.33) (0.330) 
gov_coalit 0.632 0.396 -15.60* 0.354 
 (1.372) (1.352) (7.991) (0.254) 
education2011  0.172* 0.510 -0.0123 
  (0.0943) (0.620) (0.0147) 
manager 2.751*  -17.45** 0.487* 
 (1.554)  (8.187) (0.294) 
Constant 39.31* 35.00 169.9 3.113 
 (21.79) (21.69) (114.4) (3.215) 
     
Observations 202 202 102 190 
R-squared 0.250 0.271 0.086 0.128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Model 2, shows that a city manager reduces the response time to citizens’ requests by 17 days. 
Holding all other variables constant, the presence of a city manager is expected to result in signifi-
cant speeding up in addressing citizens’ concerns (bottom-up transparency). In other words, if the 
city of Castelldefels would have adopted city manager, it would have replied to citizens’ requests in 
15 days instead of 32 days. Model 4 shows the association between the city manager and the num-
ber of citizens’ consultations in 2015. The presence of a city manager is associated with a 0.49 unit 
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increase (coefficient significant at 0.1). Taking into account that the maximum number of events 
that have been organized is 8 and the mean is 2, this increase is positive. 
 
TABLE 4, CITY MANAGER EFFECT ON MEASURES OF MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. 
OLS RESULTS  
 Surplus/capita Level of debt 
(%) 
Debt in-
crease/capita 
Tax collection 
efficacy 
(%) 
Payment 
compliance  
(%) 
Net savings  
(%) 
VARIABLES Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
       
manager 11,397 -4.327 -692,960 -4.664 -3.171 0.538 
 (690,647) (5.094) (657,311) (3.019) (2.885) (1.378) 
ingresosporhabitantehab 1,598*** 0.0138** 35.91 0.0281*** 0.0302*** 0.00582*** 
 (457.4) (0.00648) (792.8) (0.00648) (0.00669) (0.00148) 
lgpop 4.761e+06*** 21.67*** -2.328e+06*** 2.722** 1.680 -2.304*** 
 (613,677) (3.350) (566,475) (1.252) (1.365) (0.634) 
debt pc2011 399.4*** 0.00761*** -266.9*** -0.000229 -7.86e-05 -0.000850*** 
 (110.9) (0.00164) (98.81) (0.000591) (0.000677) (0.000296) 
lggnp -733,598 -9.893 7,872 -4.646 -3.698 -0.211 
 (650,349) (6.657) (701,817) (4.056) (4.251) (1.716) 
1.right -56,899 7.980* -749,670 -4.344* -4.796** -3.558*** 
 (523,376) (4.428) (474,162) (2.285) (2.294) (1.117) 
gov_coalit 134,712 -9.561** 371,872 -2.220 -1.243 2.502** 
 (523,488) (4.641) (518,503) (2.237) (2.370) (1.203) 
blood-donor_index -7,333 0.143 5,848 -0.0150 -0.0106 0.00995 
 (10,518) (0.110) (7,448) (0.0778) (0.0699) (0.0331) 
Constant -3.787e+07*** -94.60 2.140e+07** 76.06** 76.28* 29.31* 
 (8.552e+06) (66.98) (9.741e+06) (38.19) (40.68) (16.20) 
       
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.540 0.306 0.265 0.377 0.395 0.184 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
However, results do not support conclusively the hypothesis on the positive effects of a city man-
ager on financial performance (H2). Although the presence of a city manager is associated, ceteris 
paribus, with a 4.32 lower level of debt, measured as a ratio between debt and income, the relation 
fails to be significant. For instance, if Cunit, one of the most indebted cities (debt ratio of 144%), 
had a city manager its debt would decrease by approximately 1,235,832 euros (from the total of 
30,895,822 euros). However, it could be that the total municipal debt depends on many other fac-
tors than the city manager. Therefore, we used other proxies for economic performance that are 
more related to the financial management process. The results are in line with the previous indica-
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tor. In 2015, cities with dual government have on average 11.40 euros per capita higher surplus, 
ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, municipalities where a city manager operates decreased their debt in 2015 by 692.9 euros 
per capita more than those with the traditional CAO (Model 6). Consequently, the city manager is 
associated with a 0.5% higher net savings (Model 10). Although these results are substantive, they 
fail to pass statistical significance. From Table 3, we can see that compared to other factors such as 
city size, government composition, or ideology of government, the effect of a city manager on mu-
nicipal finances is lower. 
However, with other indicators of economic performance more related to management and pro-
cesses within the local administration, we get a negative impact of the city manager. Surprisingly, we 
found that having a city manager is negatively associated with tax collection efficacy (Model 8) and 
with municipal payment compliance (Model 9). Holding other variables constant, the tax collection 
efficacy is 4.6% lower in municipalities with a city manager while municipal payment compliance 
regresses by 3.2%. Although these results fail to be statistically significant, the negative sign is puz-
zling.  
These results differ to a certain extent from what the literature on city managers expects. These 
mixed results might suggest that a city manager is established in cities with a worse economic situa-
tion. However, when we control for the municipal debt levels a few years ago (2011) and the size of 
the municipal income, the relation does not change. Another plausible explanation might be that 
Spanish city managers lack the power to significantly alter the structure of municipal spending and 
financial performance due to their structural dependence on the mayor. As budgets are sensitive 
and politicized issues, they might be controlled by politicians. Here, the city manager's formal de-
pendence on the municipal leader can be relevant. This formal dependence can limit the city man-
ager’s influence on politicized issues like budget or level of spending. The alternative results with 
years of a city manager are provided in the appendix.  
Our results support the speculations that the form of government (coalition versus minority and 
majority government) and the presence of a right-wing mayor have greater influence and are statis-
tically significant in most of the financial performance models. Indeed, right-wing governments are 
associated with higher debt and lower net savings. On average, cities with right-wing mayors have 
almost 8% higher debt levels than those cities governed by other political parties (the relation is 
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significant at 0.1). Interestingly, cities with right-wing mayors have lower tax collection capacity (-
4.3%) and lower payment compliance (-4.8%). Both results are statistically significant at the 0.1 and 
0.05 levels. Right-wing mayors reduce debt faster but it seems that they do it at the expense of net 
savings, which decrease by 3.5% (this association is highly significant). Therefore, it indicates that 
right-wing governments reduce spending and the deficit but do not necessarily improve the admin-
istrative procedures, such as tax or payment compliance. 
On the other hand, the form of government (whether coalition or single-party majority or minority 
government) has an impact on economic performance. Coalition governments are less indebted 
than majoritarian governments (-9.56%) and save on average 2.5% more compared to majority 
governments. More importantly, coalition governments largely increase the responsiveness of the 
municipality to citizens’ requests. The coalition governments reply, on average, 15 days faster. The 
negative association with the indicators of tax collection and payment compliance indicates that 
coalition governments are less effective in the management of policies than single (majority or mi-
nority) governments, however, the relations fail to be significant. In sum, the coalition governments 
improve government transparency and responsiveness. Coalition governments are also associated 
with less debt and more savings but do not necessarily have a (positive) effect on internal municipal 
economic management. As both variables (manager and coalition governments) seem relevant, we 
estimated the effects of interactions between coalition government and city manager, but they were 
not significant and the overall performance of the model did not improve. 
Regarding the other control variables, the analyses show that city size is one of the most important 
factors influencing both transparency and economic performance. An increase of population by 
1,000 is associated with an increase of 1.3%. In other words, if a city with 5,000 inhabitants increas-
es its population to 20,000, the transparency would increase (all other factors constant) by 19.5 
points. The size is also the most important factor for citizen participation (1.3 consultations more) 
(relation significant at 0.1). Although not significant, the largest cities are also more effective in 
responding to citizens’ requests. This can be explained by the fact that city size encompasses many 
other factors such as administrative capacity, more civil servants, and better IT facilities. Similarly, 
the number of inhabitants influences economic performance. Larger cities have higher levels of 
debt, but also higher surpluses (in 2015) and better tax collection capacity. On the other hand, with 
city size, the net savings decrease. 
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Education level is positively associated with transparency. On the other hand, a more educated 
population is negatively associated with the municipal deficit and average tax collection efficacy. 
Contrarily, the municipal GDP is not significant in most of the models. The previous municipal 
debt limits the current level of debt, its increase, and the net savings. However, it is not significantly 
associated with the tax collection and payment compliance capacity. 
Somehow puzzling is the negative association with the social capital indicator (blood-donor index) 
with transparency. In order to rule out any error, we used two alternative measures of social capi-
tal—turnout in the national referendum in 2005 and number of internet connections per 1,000 
inhabitants—but the results (not reported in the table) are very similar. Therefore, it would be in-
teresting for future research to investigate the possible impact of social capital on local government 
transparency and performance in general.  
Instrumental Variable and 2SLS Regression 
To address the endogeneity problem, we used the distance from Barcelona (in km) as an instru-
ment. F-test for our instrument is 10.36, indicating a borderline strong instrument for the transpar-
ency model. In the rest of the models the instrument is not strong. Also in the case of municipal 
economic performance the exclusion rule does not apply, because the distance from the regional 
capital and local GDP are related. Tables 5 and 6 report all previous models using 2SLS specifica-
tions with robust standard errors. These specifications try to isolate the exogenous effects of mu-
nicipal performance on the existence of a city manager. We include the control variables from the 
previous models. Compared to the OLS estimate, the substantive impact of a city manager on 
transparency has increased as hypothesized (although not significant). The coefficient for municipal 
debt is negative and significant, as it is also significant the negative association between the city 
manager and payment compliance. The rest of the coefficients are not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
  21 
 
TABLE 5, 2SLS REGRESSION WITH KM FROM BARCELONA AS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
 
 Transparency Citizen request 
(days) 
Citizen participa-
tion 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
manager 10.11 -59.73 -1.613 
 (7.979) (65.37) (2.020) 
1.right -1.707 -4.708 -0.524** 
 (1.470) (7.800) (0.257) 
lggnp -0.962 -11.36 0.104 
 (2.514) (11.46) (0.539) 
inhab 1.04e-07*** 3.61e-08 1.86e-08* 
 (3.52e-08) (1.81e-07) (9.73e-09) 
education2011 0.214** 0.711 -0.00235 
 (0.0919) (0.654) (0.0151) 
blood-donor_index -0.0213 -0.0118 0.00156 
 (0.0357) (0.205) (0.00706) 
gov_coalit 0.646 -24.99 0.189 
 (1.431) (16.74) (0.289) 
municipal income -0.000359 0.00584  
 (0.00152) (0.00887)  
Constant 41.86* 195.7* 0.124 
 (24.14) (115.5) (5.020) 
    
Observations 202 102 190 
R-squared 0.187   
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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TABLE 6, 2SLS REGRESSION WITH KM FROM BARCELONA AS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
 
 Surplus/capita Level of debt (%) Debt increase/capita Tax collection effi-
cacy 
(%) 
Payment compliance  
(%) 
Net savings  
(%) 
VARIABLES Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
       
manager -3.655e+06 -97.53** 5.802e+06 -18.94 -29.93* 10.24 
 (3.539e+06) (46.06) (3.908e+06) (15.40) (17.75) (8.363) 
lggnp -210,233 0.0106 -771,423 -3.193 -0.828 -1.203 
 (867,747) (12.15) (1.185e+06) (4.667) (5.664) (2.133) 
gov_coalit -129,338 -13.98* 740,051 -2.854 -2.530 2.936** 
 (677,162) (7.939) (813,127) (2.695) (3.244) (1.388) 
1.right -465,822 2.265 -228,778 -5.130* -6.473** -3.016** 
 (499,776) (7.510) (589,364) (2.707) (3.200) (1.417) 
deudapc2011 456.4*** 0.00896*** -363.8** -2.34e-05 0.000311 -0.000990*** 
 (152.9) (0.00222) (177.0) (0.000690) (0.000843) (0.000338) 
education2011 59,035 -0.415 -21,287 -0.100 -0.104 0.0651 
 (37,344) (0.497) (41,107) (0.166) (0.199) (0.0821) 
blood-donor_index -8,216 0.153 5,999 -0.0129 -0.00798 0.00854 
 (12,455) (0.166) (12,223) (0.0785) (0.0825) (0.0316) 
lgpop 5.288e+06*** 35.82*** -3.294e+06*** 4.903* 5.735* -3.784*** 
 (977,015) (8.971) (1.167e+06) (2.788) (3.345) (1.403) 
ingresosporhabitantehab 1,418*** 0.0110 277.7 0.0278*** 0.0294*** 0.00609*** 
 (498.7) (0.00874) (875.8) (0.00629) (0.00663) (0.00159) 
Constant -4.773e+07*** -292.9* 3.660e+07* 46.68 18.94 49.35* 
 (1.390e+07) (154.8) (1.916e+07) (54.54) (66.79) (26.17) 
       
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.464   0.288 0.102  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Conclusions 
Managerial reforms are on the rise worldwide. It has increased steadily in both the proportion of 
American municipal governments using the council-manager form (Carr 2015; Choi, Feiock, and 
Bae 2013; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014) as well as the number of worldwide local govern-
ments with an administration headed by city managers (Longo and Ramiò 2008). Yet the study of 
the effects that city managers have on municipal performance is still in its infancy. Even within the 
United States, there are not many studies exploring the presumed benefits of council-manager gov-
ernments for local government performance in general and operational performance in particular 
(Carr 2015). Outside the United States, there are no systematic studies exploring how the introduc-
tion of city managers—in a large number of Western countries, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, 
the UK, and Australia, and in some regions within countries, such as the Catalonian cases explored 
here—have impacted local governance. 
This paper has aimed to fill these gaps by examining a novel dataset on 209 Catalan municipalities 
over 5,000 inhabitants, by exploring variables on both the political and administrative characteris-
tics of the local government as well as on a large number of socioeconomic characteristics, includ-
ing proxies for social capital. 
Our analysis shows that the presence of a city manager increases some indicators of transparency, 
responsiveness to requests, and public participation. For instance, a city manager increases the 
transparency of municipal government by 2.5 points on the scale from 0 to 100 and reduces the 
period it takes municipal officers to respond to a request for information by 17 days. Yet the effects 
of a city manager are not significant in economic performance indicators.  
We thus find robust support for H1, since towns with a city manager as CAO are more transparent 
(i.e., they disclose more information) and more responsive to citizens’ queries, and encourage more 
public participation (measured by the number of consultations) than cities without a city manager. 
Yet we do not find clear support for H2, that is, towns with a city manager as CAO will exhibit 
better financial performance than towns without a city manager. It is quite the opposite: Having a 
city manager is associated with lower tax collection efficacy and payment compliance. Although 
towns with a city manager have on average less debt, and tend to have a surplus and higher savings, 
these results are not statistically significant. 
  24 
Unlike what happens with transparency and accountability, political factors seem more relevant 
than having a city manager regarding financial performance. Specifically, we find that right-wing 
governments, on one hand, tend to have higher municipal debt levels, and on the other, they are 
faster in reducing such debt levels. The effects of coalition governments—vis-à-vis majority or 
minority single-party governments—are almost opposite to the effects of right-wing governments. 
Coalition governments, on one hand, tend to be less indebted than single-party governments, and 
on the other, they don’t reduce municipal debt. In sum, when it comes to the health of municipal 
finances, political factors are more significant than the type of administration (i.e., having a city 
manager or not). Future research should explore the theoretical mechanisms and derive testable 
propositions on how these two political factors (i.e., the ideology of the incumbent party and the 
existence of coalition governments versus single-party ones) may affect so significantly the financial 
performance of municipalities controlling for a large number of confounders.  
Generally speaking, our results are in line with those of Carr (2015) in his review of the research on 
how city managers may affect government performance. On one hand, we also find evidence in 
support of the claim that city managers improve performance in a series of relevant variables—in 
our case, those related to transparency and accountability. On the other hand, regarding financial 
performance, it is not like Carr (2015) argues, that the positive effects of city managers are not as 
strong as advocates assume, but simply that they are null.  
This puzzling mixed statistical effect of city managers on financial performance—after controlling 
for numerous factors—should also be subject to further research. To start with, many of the effects 
attributable to city managers may actually be the result of, or contingent on, other factors (Bae and 
Feiock 2004; Carr 2015). Additionally, it might also be the case that financial performance may 
almost exclusively depend on political forces and social pressures that do not disappear just because 
a professional city manager has been appointed (Deno and Mehay 1987).   
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